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MEETING THE PROSECUTION'S CASE:
TACTICS AND STRATEGIES OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
GEORGE J. COTSIRILOS*
The purpose of every function of an advocate is
to aid his client's cause-from the first word spoken
in the opening statement to the last word of the
final argument. So it is with cross-examination.
The first question concerning every witness
called by the prosecution is, "Should I cross-exam-
ine at all?" The answer to this depends upon the
answer to another question, "Have I been hurt in
any way by his testimony?" If not, it is wise to
decline to cross-examine.' The only exception
occurrs where the preparation for trial indicates
something helpful can be developed from the
mouth of the witness, although his testimony has
not been damaging. In such a case, cross-examina-
tion should be limited to the specific matter which
can be developed favorably. Caution is required
because a skillful adversary often takes his witness
over innocuous direct examination in order to set a
trap for the overly ambitious cross-examiner. Many
experienced prosecutors deliberately elicit a skimpy
story from the complaining witness on direct
examination with the hope that the anxious defense
counsel will ask penetrating questions which will
bring forth his story in full bloom and with much
added force on cross-examination.
Once the decision to cross-examine is made, the
cross-examination should be directed immediately
to the weaknesses in the witness's direct testimony.
The weak points must be explored fully and shown
clearly to the jury. The jurors can then put the
testimony into proper perspective and not give it
more weight than its intrinsic merit demands. A
witness' weak testimonial points may include his
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Illinois Bar, American Bar Association, American
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County, Illinois, 1949-1952; Instructor in Criminal
Law, John Marshall Law School, 1960-1963. The
present article incorporates in part a previous work of
this author which appeared at Cotsirilos, Cross Exam-
ination in Criminal Cases, 45 CHICAGO BAR REc. 19
(1963).
'I. GoLDSTiNm, TRIAL TEcmuQuE § 561 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as GoLDSTN]; R. KEETON, TRIAL
TACncs AND MxrEHons 89-92 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as KYETON]. See 3 Buscu, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY
TALS § 370 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Busca].
testimony itself if parts of it are inconsistent or
preposterous, his relation to an occurrence to
which he has testified, his relation to the com-
plaining witness, or his background or occupation.
His testimony can be attacked directly, by expos-
ing inconsistencies in his narrative, collaterally, by
showing good reasons for distrusting or disbeliev-
ing him, or in both ways.
To discover all the weak points requires a
thorough preparation of the law and facts of the
case and dose scrutiny of the witness during direct
examination. This leaves little or no time to com-
pile notes on his testimony. But conscientious
preparation of the case for trial will provide the
cross-examiner with occasional words or phrases in
his notes to remind him of the weak points to
develop and the questions to ask on cross-examina-
tion. No lawyer can observe a witness' demeanor
on the stand if he is preoccupied with making
copious notes of the content of the direct examina-
tion.
2
The scope of cross-examination is generally
controlled by the sound discretion of the trial
court.1 The amount of time consumed or the num-
ber of pages consumed in the transcript is never the
sole measure of permissible latitude on cross-
examination. The court is more likely to consider
whether the subjects covered on direct have been
attacked and explored sufficiently.
Just as it is important on direct examination
for counsel to place his questions in an orderly
sequence so that one question leads logically to the
next, it is equally important on cross-examination
not to permit the witness to retell his story in the
same orderly fashion.4 Instead, questions on cross-
examination should point to selected, specific
parts of the witness' direct testimony. They should
be logically arranged for that purpose. Questioning
should shift smoothly to the specific parts of the
2 J. AFPLEmAN, PREPARATION AND TRIAL 293 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as APLEmAN]; GoLnsTEIN § 557.
3 C. McComICK, EvmExcE § 30 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as McCozmcK]; 6 J. WIGoiRE, EVIDENCE § 1867
(3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as Wiomop.,].
4 GonsrEiN § 563.
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direct examination at the will of the cross-ex-
aminer.
There are various specific goals to wich cross-
examination should always be directed in order to
point out to the jury the weaknesses in thq witness's
previous testimony.5 Questioning should always
delve into the interest of the witness it; the sub-
ject-matter of the controversy 6 so as to reveal the
witness's possible motives or prejudices in favor of
the complaining witness or against the defendant7
Certainly the witness's means of knowing the facts
to which he has testified and the manner in which
he has, used these means should be brought to
light.8 Defense counsel may well seek to test the
witness's truthfulness or credibility.9 This involves
interrogation into his power of discernment, mem-
ory and description. 0 The witness is also subject
to,impeachment by comparing the witness's prior
testimony with his responses on cross-examina-
tion." In revealing such discrepancies, new or old
facts should be developed in a posture favorable
to the cross-examinerj 2
A legitimate and proper purpose of cross-exami-
nation is to discredit the witness himself.1" A
conviction of an infamous crime affects the credi-
bility of the witness in most jurisdictions. 4 Cross-
examination directed toward eliciting the fact of
such a conviction from the witness-himself is most
effective.' Local statutes and cases should be
checked to determine what types of crimes affect
a witness's credibility and the procedure which is
prescribed for putting this into evidence before a
jury.'8
5See McCoRAcU § 30; 5 WIGMORE § 1368.
6See J. BAER & S. BA.UCER, CRoss-ExAmNATION
AND Sumu=rnoN § 39 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as
BAER]; 3 BuscH § 389.
7See BAER § 39; 3 Buscu § 389; 3 WioGoBE § 949.8See 3 Busca § 378; KEETON at 114-16; 3 WiG-
moRE § 876.9See BnA §§ 22-28; GorLsTxnT §§ 612-15; KEETON
at 106-13.
10 See APPLEmAN at 310-11; 3 BuscH § 376; KEETON
at 104-06.
n See 3 BuscH §§ 394-400; GorsTxrN §§ 601-02;
KEETON at 94-98. See also Gordon v. United States,
344 U.S. 414 (1953); authorities cited note 36 infra.
2See BAR § 21; KEETON at 116-23.
1 McCoRmcK § 30; 5 WIGMORE § 1368.
14 3 WXVaoRE § 987. See, e.g., Richards v. United
States, 192 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951); People v. Romer,
218 Cal. 449, 23 P.2d 749 (1933); Moore v. Leventhal,
303 N.Y. 534, 104 N.E.2d 892 (1952).
13 WicuoR §§ 980, 980a, 985-87.6 In Illinois, for example, the defendant cannot be
cross-examined regarding a conviction for an infamous
crime, but a witness may be cross-examined on such a
conviction. People v. Birdette, 22 Ill.2d 577, 177 N.E.2d
The limited notes-taken on direct examination
and the questions. blocked'out for each witness
before trial are the starting point for cross-exami-
nation. 7 It has been observed that the more ex-
perienced a lawyer is, the more thoroughly he pre-
pares his cross-examination before the trial. 8
There are certain do's and don't's in the method
or manner of cross-examination that are funda-
mental.
1) Strike telling blows with the first few ques-
tions, but save some meaningful questions for the
end of the cross-examination.
2) Ask simple questions so that people of ordi-
nary intelligence can understand them.',9
3) Don't go over the same story as given on
direct without a purpose, like exposing a rehearsed
witness, or demonstrating his inability to recall
detail'.20
4) Don't try to be eloquent in the framing of
questions. The eloquence of the cross-examiner
should never be so conspicuous as to draw atten-
tion away from the witness.
21
5) Be a gentleman at all times, though firmness,
forcefulness, aggressiveness, and even outrage are
sometimes necessary. 2"
6) Never lose your temper. A good cross-
examiner may appear to be angry under certain
circumstances, but he never really is.2
7) Cover only the portions of the direct exami-
170 (1961). To prove the felony record of the defendant,
a certified copy of his conviction can be introduced
after he testifies. He is entitled to a limiting instruction
to the jury that the conviction pertains only to the
defendant's credibility and not to his guilt. People v.
Moses, 11 Ill.2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957).
17 A great many lawyers have written about the
method of conducting a cross-examination. Some of the
better ones are listed in the bibliography at the end of
this article.
18 Most lawyers who will tell you of brilliant cross-
examination will not confess this:
We are entranced by a brilliant flash of insight
which broke the witness, but the plain truth of
the matter is, as brother to brother, that ninety-
nine per cent of effective cross-examination is once
more our old friend 'thorough preparation,' which
places in your hands a written document with
which to contradict the witness. That usually is
the great gift of cross-examination.
Nizer, The Art of the Jury Trial, 32 CORN. L.Q. 59, 68
(1946).
'9.AprgAx at 278-79. See some examples of the
baroque in F. WROTTEsanY, Tam EXA3NATION OF
Wrn~xssEs in CouRT 70-72 (2d ed. 1926). See, e.g.,
Riggs v. State, 235 Ind. 499, 135 N.E.2d 247 (1956).
20 See 3 BuscH § 406; GoLns-iNq § 563.21 G USTEiN § 566.
2" See WRoT EsLE-, supra note 19, at 72-74.




nation necessary to demonstrate weak spots.
Witnesses can be stupid, evasive, hostile, dishonest
or flippant. Cross-examination should be directed
toward the particular weakness and nothing
more.2'
8) Don't make much of minor triumphs. The
inexperienced lawyer often gloats over slight
discrepancies by repeating the questions or repeat-
ing the answer. Juries are not impressed.2 5
9) Quietly pass on to another question if the
witness' response has been harmful to your case.
10) Control the loquacious witness. He is an
adverse witness and may say something damaging
if given the chance.
28
11) Each cross-examiner should be himself,
whether he is bombastic and aggressive or smooth
and quiet. But don't be monotonous, using only
one technique. 7
12) Don't ask a question without knowing the
answer, if it is a critical question. Otherwise the
answer doesn't matter, and may not help.
13) Make the point, then pass on to something
else.
29
14) Don't humiliate the witness by shouting,
browbeating, or embarassing him. The jury is more
likely to identify with the helpless witness than
with the over-brilliant lawyer.30
15) Never hazard an important question with-
out laying the proper foundation. Ask a series of
questions which elicit a series of affirmative re-
sponses, building to the final telling question,
which also must be answered in the affirmative.31
16) Attack the credibility of a witness with
great care. Never ask a question accusing him of




5 Id. § 568.26 See Friedman, Some Gentle Hints on the Art of
Cross-Examination, 9 PRAc. LAw. 35, 37 (May, 1966).
2
7See BAER § 372; 2 M. BELLI, MODERN TRLALs
§§ 283(1)-(3) (1954) (hereinafter cited as BEI);
Jaworski, Cross-Examination of Witnesses, 19 Aax. L.
R v. 37 (1965).
28 Older lawyers have always said, "If you don't
know the answer, don't ask the question." See, e.g.,
GoI.nsTEN § 559; W. RIYNorms, TRaI EVIDENCE
§ 142 (1911). This is too general to be entirely accurate.
29 See Busch, Some Observations on Cross-Examina-
tion, 24 ALA. LAw. 227, 233-35 (1963); GoLmsTxN
§ 567; Jaworski, supra note 27, at 41.
30See Goim7siN § 558; LAxE, supra note 23, at 32;
WRoTSTEssY, supra note 19, at 74-75.
81This follows a simple dialectic technique which
has been proved successful for hundreds of years.
Lawrence, The Art of Advocacy, 50 A.B.A.J. 1121, 1124
(1964). See GorLsTEmn § 560.
323 Busca §§ 386-87.
The foregoing are accepted guides for the cross-
examiner, but they are not hard and fast rules.
The best trial lawyer is the one who knows the
well-established rules of the art of cross-examina-
tion but has a lively appreciation of when they
should be broken. Often it is necessary to take a
risk in cross-examination, particularly when the
cross-examiner is in a desperate situation which is
salvageable only by dramatic questions. As in
every move made during the course of a trial,
asking a question on cross-examination involves a
subtle value judgment. In desperate situations,
the accomplished cross-examiner often thinks, 'q
have nothing to lose now-I might as well ask the
question." Under the circumstances, some of the
rules must be broken.
Never ask questions on cross-examination merely
because the questions are suggested by the client.8
A particular question should be weighed by the
same standards the cross-examiner u es for his own
questions. Satisfying the client should not enter
into the determination. The responsibility for the
eventual success in the litigation is the lawyer's,
and the client will hold the lawyer responsible if
mistakes are made, even though he suggested the
mistakes.
The aforementioned principles do not admit to
universal application. Obviously the style and
strategy of cross-examination will vary considera-
bly with the idiosyncracies of each witness. Certain
legal and practical principles, however, do apply
to each of the various categories of witnesses that
commonly confront defense attorneys in criminal
cases.
PoLIcE OMriCERS
Generally, police officers can be broken down
into two categories-arresting officers and investi-
gating officers. Frequently, the arresting officer is
also an eyewitness and should be treated the same
as any other eyewitness. An investigating officer
usually enters the case after the occurrence and, if
there is a statement or a confession, he generally
has either taken it or is a witness to it.
In preparation for the cross-examination of a
police officer, one should get as much information
from the police file as possible. In an identification
case, it is wise to subpoena the original station
complaint, the message sent out over the police
wires giving descriptions, and any other docu-
mentary evidence produced while the case was in
13 BAER § 33; LAxE, supra note 23, at 312-13.
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police hands. Also, examine any physical objects
in the hands of the police, such as ballistics, cloth-
ing, handwriting samples and narcotics. If there
is an allegation of brutality, obtain the admission
card from the jail to see if the doctors have recorded
bruises. Where the coroner is involved, the in-
vestigating officers may have read into the record
statements of witnesses and statements of the ac-
cused which counsel should have. Moreover, the
police officer's testimony at the preliminary hear-
ing or at the coroner's inquest may be a basis for
impeachment.
It is now established in most jurisdictions that
the previous statements of witnesses are generally
available to the defense after the witness's direct
testimony." Consistent with this rule, the portions
of a police officer's reports to his superiors which
relate to his testimony in court should be made
available to defense counsel for cross-examina-
tion." In the federal courts, the Jencks Act"
codifies this rule. Under the Act, the defendant is
given the right to inspect statements, notes, or re-
ports of a government witness for purposes of
cross-examination subject to one limitation. The
items which defendant may have produced must
relate "to the subject matter as to which the wit-
ness has testified." 17 If the trial judge, after exam-
ining the statements, rules that the reports do not
relate to the police officer's testimony on direct,
defense counsel should ask that they be impounded
to preserve the point for appeal.
As a general proposition, the cross-examination
of police officers is very delicate because they are
usually antagonistic toward the defendant." Many
inexperienced cross-examiners try to humiliate
police officers, often with the contrary result that
31 People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 355 P.2d 641,
7 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1960); People v. Cole, 30 BI.2d 375,
196 N.E.2d 691 (1964); People v. Moses, 11 I11.2d 84,
142 N.E.2d 1 (1957); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d,
173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S. 448 (1961); State v. White,
15 Ohio St.2d 146, 239 N.E.2d 65 (1968). See Annot.,
7 A.L.R.3d 181 (1966).
"State v. Saenz, 88 Ariz. 154, 353 P.2d 1026 (1960);
People v. Scott, 29 11.2d 97, 193 N.E.2d 814 (1963);
State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 141 N.W.2d 815
(1966); Commonwealth v. Swierczewski, 215 Pa. Super.
130, 257 A.2d 336 (1969).
3' 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. IV, 1969). The Jencks
Act was promulgated in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957). For further discussion of the Jencks Act, see
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); Norton,
Discovery in the Criminal Process, 61 J. CRnm L.C. &
P.S. 11, 28-30 (1970); Comment, The Jencks Act: After
Six Years, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1133 (1963).
v 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
8Cf. J. Sxoumcx, JusricE WrzxouT t= (1966).
they themselves are humiliated. Police officers
often have great experience in testifying and they
have a marked antipathy toward lawyers." They
pounce upon the slightest opportunity to fence
with lawyers from the witness stand. A police of-
ficer who has investigated his case thoroughly is
well informed and, if given an opportunity, will
volunteer information harmful to the defendant.
An officer often fashions himself a great law en-
forcer and feels that it is within his line of duty to
do everything possible to convict.4 The cross-
examiner should be scrupulously careful never to
ask the question "why?" 41 This holds especially
true for police officers.
On the other hand, a police officer who clearly
and unfairly demonstrates his antagonism toward
the defendant can be the subject of a justified
attack by defense counsel. Generally cross-exami-
nation to reveal the interest, motive, ill-feeling or
bias of a witness is admissible, and its exclusion
"9A. CoRNELus, THE CRoss-ExAwMIATIoN or
WiNEssEs 176 (1929). This antipathy may result
from lawyers who write like this:
Policemen as a class, are usually not well edu-
cated, skilled mechanically or industrious. They
are men above the average in physical strength
and appearance who have lacked sufficient per-
sistence to acquire an education or learn a trade.
Their contacts with the criminal element tends to
make them suspicious of human nature. They are
daily engaged in the prosecution of others, and of
course, in defending their own acts. Their entire
attention is focused upon the derelictions of man-
kind and not to the more noble, kindlier or more
humanitarian traits. Therefore, it naturally fol-
lows that when a person is charged with a crime,
the officer is naturally predisposed toward belief
in his guilt. This, ofttimes, leads him to testify to
things as actual facts about which he has no pro-
fessional knowledge, and to state boldly that a
certain thing happened, when, what he actually
saw were merely circumstantial facts.
Id.
Much of the disdain for lawyers can be attributed
to the restrictions recent constitutional decisions have
placed on law enforcement officers. See Inbau, .Public
Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's
Stand, 53 J. Cmx. L.C. & P.S. 85 (1962), wherein at
86 and 89 the author states,
The Court has taken upon itself, without constitu-
tional authorization, to police the police....
[Law enforcement officers cannot offer the re-
quired protection demanded of them from within
the strait-jacket placed upon them by present day
court and legislative restrictions.
See also Carrington, Speaking for the Police, 61 1. Can.
L.C. & P.S. 244, 250 (1970).
4 This attitude may come from the expectations of
society, rather than from any innate mental processes.
See Ward, The Police Role: A Case of Diversity, 61 J.
Cain. L.C. & P.S. 580 (1970).
" See Keeton at 131-32; L. F AN, ESSENTmi,
or CRoss-ExAIINATIoN § 8.1 (1968).
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may constitute reversible error.A Counsel for the
defense is not bound by a police witness's answers
denying any special bias or prejudice. He may offer
contradictory evidence if it is sufficiently proba-
tive.3 It is an old adage that police officers are
placed on trial rather than defendants where it is
quite obvious that they have used brutal methods
in obtaining a confession or are dearly guilty of
other improper conduct."
Many times, it is advantageous to attack a
police officer on collateral matters, especially
where he has been on the force for a long time. For
instance, the police officer may allege that he ob-
tained an oral statement or confession from the
defendant. In any type of serious charge, it is ex-
pected that the police officer will reduce the state-
ment or confession to writing and ask the defendant
to sign it. His failure to do this immediately makes
the statement suspect and is an inferential accusa-
tion that the police officer is either inept, or the
defendant never made the alleged oral statement.'
One example of police ineptness was pointed up
in a murder trial where the defendant surrendered
himself with an attorney at a police station. They
left unescorted and the sergeant, who directed
them to another station, went back to work, com-
pletely oblivious to the fact that a potential
murderer walked the streets and might not go to
the other station. Though it had no direct rele-
vance in the case, it held the police officer up to
some ridicule, while emphatically making the
point that the defendant voluntarily surrendered.
Special problems are presented on the cross-
examination of police officers on motions to sup-
press physical evidence or confessions.45 In cross-
examining police officers in these areas, it is
important to dwell on probabilities. It is highly
improbable that a person who has remained in
4 Peinhardt v. State, 262 Ala. 10, 76 So.2d 179
(1954); State v. Lewis, 236 La. 473, 108 So.2d 93 (1959);
Flannigan v. State, 124 Neb. 748, 248 N.W. 92 (1933).
See 3 Buscu § 388.
4Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633, 640 (D.C.
Cir. 1942).44Consider Chief Justice Warren's introductory
statement in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439
(1966):
The cases before us raise questions which go to
the roots of our concepts of American criminal
jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe
consistent with the Federal Constitution in pros-
ecuting individuals for crime.
45 See, e.g., IL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 114-11, 114-12
(1969). In Illinois, as in other jurisdictions, motions
to suppress illegally seized evidence or confessions are
made before trial. As a matter of practice, judges allow
defense counsel considerable latitude in the scope of
police cross-examination.
custody for an extended period of time and refused
to give a confession until the last moment has
given that confession voluntarily.4 It is also highly
improbable that an experienced burglar arrested
on the street would voluntarily give consent to
police officers to go to his home and make a search.,
Each situation presents a much different problem,
but the probabilities should be developed by the
cross-examiner in accordance with the most logical
human behavior of the individuals involved
7
In cross-examining police officers who are eye-
witnesses, or any other eyewitness, it is of the
utmost importance to view and examine the scene
of the occurrence. Not only is such an examination
a genuine help for the cross-examination of wit-
nesses, but it also indicates to the jury that the
cross-examiner is familiar with the scene. The jury
and the court respect a lawyer who knows what
he is talking about and is thoroughly prepared.
EYEWITNESSES
When the cross-examiner embarks on the cross-
examination of an eyewitness, it should be with
purpose and dear direction. A good identification
can be reinforced by purposeless cross-examina-
tion, just as a bad identification can be destroyed
by careful cross-examination.
If the cross-examiner has prepared his case,
he has many tools with which to cross-examine ef-
fectively. He may have the description given to
the police by the identification witness immediately
after the crime occurred. If such description was
recorded by the police and sent out over the police
teletype or other communication means, it can be
subpoenaed by defense counsel.4 If this descrip-
tion differs markedly from the defendant's actual
description, cross-examination of the eyewitness
can be devastating. Another valuable tactic is to
determine whether the witness made his original
identification from a picture or in a show-up. If it
was from a picture, it should be determined how
many pictures and how many volumes of police
photographs the witness looked at as well as how
46 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 406 (1966);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
47 3 Buscn § 380.
48 FED. R. C~an. P. 17 (c). See Bowman Dairy Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951); Mackey v. United
States, 351 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1965); People v. Shipp,
59 Cal.2d 845, 31 Cal. Rptr. 457, 382 P.2d 577 (1963).
For the limitations of Rule 17(c), see, e.g., United
States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653, 669 (2d Cir. 1965);
United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 821-22 (2d




old the picture of the defendant was. The cross-
examiner might demand that the prosecutor or the
police present this picture in open court if the
similarity is not a good one.49 If it was a show-up,
defense counsel might ask who were the other
people in the line-up. If they were all men who were
quite different from the defendant in size, manner
of dress, or in any other respect so that the defend-
ant's appearance was grossly conspicuous, the
line-up can be revealed as a mere farce.50 Indeed,
the cross-examination of an identifying witness
may demonstrate that there was no line-up at all.
The courts have held that such an identification
is impaired although not completely discredited.5'
This type of examination may prove useful in a
voir dire hearing on a motion to suppress the pre-
trial identification of the defendant based upon
the United States Supreme Court decisions in
United States v. Wade2 and Gilbert v. California
3
and their progeny. Wade was based on the theory
that counsel's assistance at a line-up is indispensi-
ble to protect a defendant's basic right to mean-
ingful cross-examination.5 In these situations,
49Photographs can be produced under the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), however, only if the wit-
ness makes a statement based on them. Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386-89 (1968). See note
36 supra.
50 It may also, of course, be so suggestive that it
should be thrown out entirely as violative of due proc-
ess of law, depending on "the totality of the circum-
stances" surrounding the identification. Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). See Foster v. Cal-
ifornia, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968). What constitutes that degree of
suggestiveness is far from certain. See Biggams v.
Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, reh. denied, 390 U.S. 1037
(1968) (affirmed by equally divided court); People v.
Floyd, 1 Cal.3d 694, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64
(1970); State v. Monteiro, -N.H.-, 261 A.2d 269
"(1969); State v. Mustacchio, 57 N.J. 265, 271 A.2d
582 (1970).
51 Identification is an issue for the trier of fact, and
it need not be positive to support a conviction. See,
e.g., Neighbors v. People, -Colo.-, 467 P.2d 804
(1970); People v. Oswald, 26 Ill.2d 567, 187 N.E.2d
685 (1963); People v. Barnes, 118 Ill. App.2d 128, 255
N.E.2d 18 (1969); State v. DeFoe, 284 Minn. 110, 169
N.W.2d 404 (1969); State v. Matlack, 49 NJ. 491, 231
A.2d 369 (1967); State v. Harris, 40 Wis.2d 200, 161
N.W.2d 385 (1968).
52388 U.S. 218 (1967).
- 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
U 388 U.S. at 237. While some jurisdictions limit
Wade to post-indictment line-ups, there is much to say
for requiring the presence of counsel at pre-indictment
line-ups, since the same prejudicial factors are present.
See id. at 228-36; cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1,
19 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)
Many states have so extended the right to counsel as
a matter of state law. See People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335,
82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643 (1969); Joyner v. State,
7 Md. App. 692, 257 A.2d 444 (1969); Palmer v. State,
most courts have concerned themselves primarily
with a consideration of whether the pre-trial
identification was so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to mistaken identification so as to de-
prive the defendant of due process. 55 Such inquiry
can demonstrate to the court that the witness may
not have had an adequate basis for the courtroom
identification and, therefore, the in-court identifi-
cation was tainted at the pre-trial confrontation.
In such event, the in-court identification is sup-
pressed and cannot be put before the jury. If, how-
ever, it is put before the jury, counsel has had the
advantage of his pre-trial "dry run."
Quite often it is important to ask an eyewitness
if he gave a description of the person he accused
and, if so, whether he pointed out certain obvious
characteristics of the defendant. If the defendant
has a pronounced nose, mustache, or any other
outstanding characteristic that the witness failed
to give in his original description, such things
should be revealed in order to diminish the value
of the identification. Similarly, the manner of dress
of the person accused in the original description is
extremely important.
Another type of cross-examination is to ask the
eyewitness about other things surrounding the
crime. If a car was used, ask for a description of
the car. If the crime occurred in given surround-
ings-a room, a store, or any other type of en-
closure-have the witness give details about these
surroundings to test his recollection with regard
to details.
The rule permitting the exclusion of witnesses
from a courtroom while the other witnesses are
testifying is never more valuable than when eye-
witnesses are being cross-examined. 56 A celebrated
5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969); Commonwealth
v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970); Hayes
v. State, 46 Wis.2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970). But see
People v. Palmer, 41 Ill.2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969);
State v. Mustacchio, 57 N.J. 265, 271 A.2d 582 (1970).
55 See note 51 supra. See Comment, The Right to
Counsel at Lineups, Wade and Gilbert in the Lower
Courts, 36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 830 (1969).56 Generally, the exclusion of witnesses is discretion-
ary with the court, although in practice, it is very sel-
dom denied if a timely motion is made. See, e.g., United
States v. 5 Cases, 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950); Coonan
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 25 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa.
1938); Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. Smith, 193 Cal.
App.2d 338, 14 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
Devlin v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 549,
78 P.2d 952 (1938). Abuse of this discretion in a crim-
inal case may be grounds for reversal, however. See
People v. Dixon, 23 Ill.2d 136, 177 N.E.2d 206 (1961);
State v. Pikul, 150 Conn. 195, 187 A.2d 442 (1962);
Annot., 32 AL.R.2d 358 (1953).
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case17 involving the robbery-murder of a partici-
pant in a card game in a home where there were
ten to fifteen people present demonstrated this.
The cross-examination of seven or eight of the
participant-witnesses regarding identification of
one of the robbers showed that these people may
have seen the same person, but their descriptions
were so different that by the time each was cross-
examined at great length, the jury was so confused
that a verdict of not guilty was returned. It was
subsequently shown that the defendant was, in
fact, the killer in this case, but the effective cross-
examination of the identifying witnesses and the
rule of exclusion won the case for the defense.
MEDICAL AND ScIENTmIc EXPERTS
Persons with special knowledge, training, skill
and experience not possessed by laymen are per-
mitted to testify as expert witnesses.5 Unless
counsel is properly prepared, the cross-examination
of an expert witness is dangerous as well as diffi-
cult. The best way to prepare is to consult with
an expert in the same field. It is wise, if the court
permits," to have a defense expert sitting in the
courtroom during the direct examination of the
prosecution's expert. The danger in cross-examin-
ing an expert is that on each question, he is per-
mitted to elaborate and to give full explanations
on matters within his own special knowledge even
though he may have merely touched upon them
on direct examination.a Unless the cross-examiner
knows exactly where he is going with each question
and reasonably expects to contradict the answers
given on direct, he should restrict his cross-exami-
nation or not cross-examine at all.
Normally, the expert put on the stand has im-
pressive qualifications. If the cross-examiner is
aware of these qualifications and knows them to
be accurate, he is wise to stipulate to them to
avoid the effect before the jury. If the expert's
qualifications are not especially impressive and
the cross-examiner intends to put on his own ex-
pert later to contradict the expert on the stand,
he should permit the qualifications to be elicited
"This case was finally decided as People v. Horo-
decki, 15 Ill.2d 130, 154 N.E.2d 67 (1958).
See 2 WiGmoP §§ 555-56, 559-62.
092 BExi § 288(1); I. GoLnsTEn & L. SUABAT,
IEDICAL TRIAL TECHNIQU1E 20 (1942).
60See Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 478 (1962). See, e.g.,
Space Aero Products Co., Inc. v. R. E. Darling Co.,
Inc., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
843 (1965); Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher,
202 Va. 452, 117 S.E.2d 685 (1961).61GoiTS'Ir § 490; KEEToN at 147-48.
in order to show the comparison with his own
expert."
At times, it is also wise to go into the question
of the renumeration that the expert is receiving
for testifying." If the cross-examiner has informa-
tion that the expert is being compensated by an
exorbitant sum, he might go into this fact to show
that the expert is not objective but a paid partisan.
If the expert has answered a hypothetical ques-
tion on direct, it is important to review the ques-
tion with another expert to see if an error can be
found in the observed or assumed facts or in the
conclusion or opinion of the expert on which he
can be cross-examined 4 Nothing is more damaging
to the expert than bring out such an error. If the
cross-examiner can impeach the qualifications of
the expert by showing either a misstatement of
his qualifications or by showing that there is a
general lack of qualifications, the jury will surely
take notice.6" Some considerations concerning the
more frequently-encountered expert witnesses
follow.
Usually, the state's pathologist in a homicide
case simply gives an opinion as to the cause of
death in simple or technical terms. In the typical
homicide case, a cross-examination of the patholo-
gist is useless. 6  It only becomes important to
cross-examine him when the defense contends that
the injury inflicted by the defendant did not in
fact cause death. In such instances, do not cross-
examine until the defense pathologist performs an
autopsy or examines the supporting documents
received from the state's pathologist. The patholo-
gist should also be cross-examined where it is be-
lieved that the injury may give a clue to the physi-
cal circumstances of the occurrence. For example,
the path of a bullet might indicate the position of
the deceased in relation to the position of the
defendant. An important item to look into is the
toxicologist's report that supports the findings of
the pathologist.7
62 KEETON at 153-54.
6 See BAER § 49; Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1171 (1954).
' 2 BELLI §288(2). See FFIEDMAN, supra, note 41,
§ 10.14; Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 6 (1960).
66 3 WiGmom § 991; 5 WiGmoRE § 1621. See ApPLE-
mAN at 470-72.66 A coroner's testimony is not so authoritative, since
most coroners are laymen. See W. CUPR", MEC c.
PRooF IN LGATION 29-30 (1961); J. RicnAnsoN,
DocToRs, LAwYERS, Am E CouRs 169-74 (1965).
67See, e.g., State v. Pease, -Vt.-_, 271 A.2d 835
(1970) (medical examiner's report of blood alcohol did




A ballistics expert is extremely difficult to cross-
examine, particularly if he has compared the pellets
taken from the deceased's body with pellets fired
from the same gun immediately after the occur-
rence leading to the death. Such comparisons are
about as accurate as fingerprint comparisons and
their accuracy is almost unimpeachable.6 If,
however, the pellets compared have been fired
from the same gun after a long interval, something
can be made on cross-examination of the fact that
the lands and grooves of a gun change with the
passage of time.6" Since this is such a highly tech-
nical field, the cross-examiner must have his own
expert examine the ballistics information in order
to prepare for cross-examination.
Handwriting experts are often worth cross-
examining because the expert merely gives an
opinion about certain similarities in the known
handwriting and the unknown handwriting. 0 Be-
cause it is not an exact science, cross-examination
can be directed toward the fact that the expert is
only giving an opinion3n Cross-examination can be
directed toward the fact that the same person
writes differently during different periods of his
lifetime and that the same person writes differently
in different positions.7 The cross-examiner should
compare handwriting in a standing position with
63 3 BELLI § 380. See Berg, Filing .22 Firing Pin Im-
pressions, 55 J. Cum. L.C. & P.S. 290 (1964); Bigler,
Identification by Means of Revolver Chamber Markings,
55 J. Crxm. L.C. & P.S. 155 (1964); Matthews, A
Measurement of Land Impressions on Fired Bullets, 44
J. CRe. L.C. & P.S. 799 (1954).
The incompetent expert is quite another matter. See
J. GiumrHR & C. GUNTHMR, Tan IrENTnicATioN or
F=Ams 312-25 (1935).69 See Van Amburgh, Common Sources of Error in
the Examination and Interpretation of Ballistics Evi-
dence, 26 BOSTON U.L. RnEv. 207 (1946).
70sec C.A. MircErI, DocumENTs Aim TBEm
ScmEN c EXAMNATION (1922); A. OsBomx, Tan
PROBLmm or PRoor (2d ed. 1926); Annot., 128 A.L.R.
1329 (1940).
71 See LA=E, supra note 23, at 230-35; Conway, The
Identification of Handwriting, 45 J. Crm. L.C. & P.S.
605 (1955); Smith, Determining Tendencies, 55 J.
Cmm L.C. & P.S. 526 (1964); Smith, Six Basic Factors
in Handwriting Identification, 44 J. CRi,. L.C. & P.S.
810 (1954).
Indeed, Wigmore states that "any person able to
read and write is competent to form and to express a
judgment as to the genuineness of handwriting," unless
technical problems are present, dealing with paper, ink,
or alterations. 2 WiGooKE § 570 (emphasis removed).
See 3 WiGmoRE §693; 7 WsEGsoRE § 2012. See, e.g.,
Black, Identifying Ball Pens by the Burr Striations, 61
J. Cmmn. L.C. & P.S. (1970); Crown, et al., Differentia-
tion of Blue Ballpoint Inks, 52 J. CnMM. L.C. & P.S. 338
(1961); Mathyer, The Expert Examination of Signa-
tures, 52 J. Cn, L.C. & P.S. 122 (1961).
7F2RMuxAN, supra note 41, § 58.
that executed in a sitting position, or perhaps
when signing for a package. If the defense expert
confirms the opposing expert, however, the cross-
examination should be restricted to innocuous
questions, such as the remuneration the expert is
receiving for his services or the fact that he always
testifies for either the prosecution or the defense.y
Psychiatric testimony is probably the most
difficult of all expert testimony to give and to
understand. 4 It is a rare case when expert wit-
nesses cannot be obtained who will contradict each
other, either wholly or partially, regarding the
psychiatric condition of the defendant.
75 Most
psychiatrists who take the witness stand have seen
the defendant only for a short time. Much should
be made of this on cross-examination.76 Jurors, as
well as many judges, do not have a great deal of
confidence in psychiatric testimony so a vigorous
cross-examination of psychiatrists is wise, particu-
larly if the cross-examiner puts a defense psychia-
trist on the stand to give contradictory testimony.
Since accounting is quite exact and lawyers are
particularly inept with figures, the cross-examina-
tion of an accountant should be assumed gingerly.
Here, above all, a lawyer should have an account-
ant who has examined all the books and records
sitting at counsel table if he intends to cross-
examine effectively. An effective cross-examination
should be directed toward honest differences among
accountants in their definition and treatment of
capital investments and expense items, deprecia-
ble assets, or in methods of bookkeeping 7 The
73 See Moore, Cross-Examining the Incompetent Docu-
ment Examiner, 1 WAsanmun L.J. 533, 545-46 (1962);
MooRE, Testimony of the Expert Document Examiner,
22 U. Prrr. L. REv. 675, 698-703 (1961).
74 See S. GLOEcx, LAW AND PsYcHIATRY 5-19 (1962);
S. GLIECK, METr. DIsORDER AND THE CRIMINAL
LAw 87-95, 441-49 (1925); M. GurrTACnnR & H.
WEoRFEN, PsycmATRY AND mn LAW 3-5 (1952);
Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert
Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63
MICH. L. REv. 1335 (1965); Karpman, An Attempt at a
Re-evaluation of Some Concepts of Law and Psychiatry,
38 J. Csuie. L.C. & P.S. 207 (1947); Overholser, Psy-
chiatric Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases since
McNaughten-a Review, 42 J. Cm. L.C. & P.S. 283
(1951); Suarez, A Critique of the Psychiatrist's Role as
Expert Witness, 12 J. FOR. Scr. 172 (1967).
75 See Kinberg, Forensic Psychiatry without Meta-
physics, 40 3. Cmm. L.C. & P.S. 555 (1950); Selling,
Forensic Psychiatry, 39 J. Cas. L.C. & P.S. 606,
610-12 (1949).
7 See LAKE, supra note 23, at 283. See Gu~rrAcEax
& WEmOFEN, supra note 74, at 230-47.
77 See B. FERST, BAsIc AccouNTiNO FOR LAW3YERS
4-6, 84-86 (1950); H. FnNuEn & R. OLDBERG, LAw-
TeER's GuIDm TO ACcoCNTmN 77-89, 91 (1955); G.
HIs, THE LAw or AccONTNG AND FiNANcIAL
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typical trial lawyer can bring out these points on
cross-examination only after being shown them by
an accountant. Unless the cross-examiner knows
exactly where he is going, he is better off to refrain
from cross-examination.
ACCOMPLICES AND ADDICT INFORMERS
Though the limit of cross-examination is within
the sound discretion of the trial court, great lati-
tude is allowed in the cross-examination of a
witness for the prosecution to show motive. 7n The
general rule of liberal latitude is particularly ap-
plicable where the witness was an accomplice of
the defendant. 9 It is normally prejudicial error
for the trial court not to permit an inquiry of an
accomplice about explicit or implicit promises of
immunity from prosecution. 0 Also, remarks by the
court that such an inquiry is not material is preju-
dicial error."' An accomplice who has been sen-
tenced may be cross-examined along the line that
his sentence may be shortened because of his
testimony or other charges pending against him
may be dropped.2 He may be questioned concern-
STATEMENTS 3-41, 167-77 (1957); H. SE:Ne, ATroR-
NEYs' PR.cricAL GIDE To AccoroNG 1-20-1-30,
8-1--8-4 (1965).
7 3 WiomoMR § 944. See Alford v. United States,
282 U.S. 687 (1931); Rosado v. United States, 370
F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 386 U.S. 1010
(1967); People v. Werhollick, 45 Ill.2d 459, 259 N.E.
2d 265 (1970); State v. Curcio, 23 N.J. 521, 129 A2d
871 (1957); State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 117 A.2d 473
(1955); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 613, 616-24 (1958).
793 WiGo Eo §§ 916(3), 967. See Alford v. United
States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); United States v. Masino,
275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960); State v. Holden, 88 Ariz.
43, 352 P.2d 705 (1960); People v. Winston, 46 Cal.2d
151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956); People v. Baker, 16 Ill.2d
364, 158 N.E.2d 1 (1959); 62 A.L.R.2d at 624-29.
The right to cross-examine can be abused, however.
See Beach v. United States, 149 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir.
1945) (defense counsel may not ask impeaching ques-
tions third time).
80 3 WIGxroRE § 967. See Alford v. United States,
282 U.S. 687 (1931); United States v. Hogan, 232 F.2d
905 (3d Cir. 1956); People v. Simard, 314 Mich. 624,
23 N.W.2d 106 (1946); State v. Taylor, 49 N.J. 440,
231 A.2d 212 (1967); State v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 221
A.2d 529 (1966); 62 A.L.R.2d at 630-53.
81 See, e.g., People v. Dail, 111 P.2d 723, 727 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1941), modified, 22 Cal.2d 642, 140 P.2d
828 (1943).
8 3 Wiassp.o § 967. See Sandroff v. United States,
158 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1946); State v. Hogan, 13 N.J.
Misc. 117, 176 A. 709 (1935); State v. Bailey, 208 Ore.
321, 300 P.2d 975 (1956). Furthermore, the prosecution
has a duty to come forward with the truth, if it knows
it, when its witness lies. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959); People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 154 N.Y.S.2d
885, 136 N.E.2d 853 (1956); Napue v. People, 13 Ill.2d
566, 571, 150 N.E.2d 613, 616 (1958), rev'd., 360 U.S.
264 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
ing special treatment by the jailer,3 an expectation
of nollk prosequi, or even hopes of immunity. 4 He
may be questioned about hopes of financial gain,
such as a reward, even though the source is private
and does not come from the state." The most typi-
cal instance occurrs when the defendant seeks to
show on cross-examination that the accomplice
now testifying against him has been released from
custody, no indictment has been returned against
him, and he is not threatened with or in danger of
being charged for complicity in the crime.
The extent to which the cross-examination of
an accomplice may be pursued is pointed up in a
case in which the accomplice testified that he had
no direct promise of favorable treatment from the
state's attorney, but that he expected that he
would receive leniency." Defense counsel asked
upon what particular occurrence, transaction, or
conversation he based his conclusion, but an ob-
jection by the prosecution to the questioning was
sustained. t In reversing, the court stated that it
was proper for counsel to inquire into the particu-
lars forming the basis of the accomplice's conclu-
sion. Many experienced lawyers do not search
sufficiently into the reasons for an accomplice's
expectations of leniency. The liberality of the
decided cases 4 should serve as a reminder to
lawyers who are frustrated by overly strict trial
courts that they are entitled to the closest cross-
examination possible where accomplices testify. 9
8 See, e.g., People v. Bote, 376 Ill. 264, 33 N.E.2d
449 (1941).
843 Wim oRE § 967. See Hudson v. United States,
387 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 876
(1968); State ex rel. Kowalski v. Kubiak, 256 Wis. 518,
41 N.W.2d 605 (1950). Cf. Orozco-Vasquez v. United
States, 344 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1010 (1967); United States v. Migliorino, 238
F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1956); State v. Vigorito, 2 NJ. 185, 65
A.2d 841 (1949).
80 3 WiGmoR § 969(3). See Harris v. United States,
371 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1967); People v. Todd, 301 Ill.
85, 133 N.E. 645 (1922); Bewley v. State, 247 Ind. 652,
220 N.E.2d 612 (1966); State v. Martinsen, 198 Iowa
1325, 201 N.W. 1 (1924); Commonwealth v. Sacket,
39 Mass. 394 (1839); 62 A.L.R.2d at 653-60. Cf. Annot.,
120 A.L.R. 751 (1939).8 6 People v. Moshiek, 323 Ill. 11, 153 N.E. 720 (1926).
' Id. at 20-21, 153 N.E. at 724.
88 See notes 78-85 supra.
89 An interesting situation developed in one Illinois
case, People v. Durand, 321111.526, 152 N.E. 569 (1926).
An accomplice sat through the entire trial ostensibly
as a co-defendant before he testified that he had an
agreement with the prosecution all along. The Illinois
Supreme Court said:
Where an accomplice is used as a witness for the
prosecution the widest latitude of cross-examina-
tion ought to be permitted. There is always the
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Somewhat different is the case where the de-
fendant attempts to attack the credibility of an
accomplice or an informer, not on the ground that
he has a motivation to get the defendant convicted,
but on the ground that the informer or accomplice
is a generally untrustworthy character for one
reason or another.90 It is proper to get the address
of the accomplice, however reluctant he may be
to reveal it, in order to conduct an investigation
regarding his credibility and reputation."
Because the addict informer differs from an ac-
complice in some respects so does the cross-
examination of such a witness. An informer will
often approach the police in the first instance to
inform them that he will be able to "put them on
to something." He will then assist the police in the
preparation of the arrest and will often participate
as a "special police employee" 12 in the crime itself.
This is different from an accomplice, who in most
instances is arrested with the defendant and then
decides to extricate himself from the situation.
The addict informer has many reasons for coop-
erating with the police. Most of the reasons that
apply to accomplices also apply to addict in-
formers. The cross-examination of an informer wit-
ness as to this area is the same as for accomplices.
However, the addict informer is unique in some
temptation for an accomplice to testify falsely, and
the jury are entitled to know what inducements
have been held out to him as a reward for his as-
sistance to the prosecution, and anything else
that in any way affects his credibility. This rule
applies with even greater force where an accomplice
sits at the trial table as a defendant and tricks his
co-defendant into belief that he is going to work in
harmony with him in defense of the charge.
Id. at 530, 152 N.E. at 571. Despite the court's strong
language, however, this was held harmless error due to
the strength of the corroborating evidence of guilt.90See generally 3 WiGopomE §§ 926, 977, 980-87. See
Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
United States v. Benson, 369 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 903 (1968); Beaudine v. United
States, 368 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1966); People v. Cardi-
nal, 154 Cal. App.2d 835, 316 P.2d 1001 (1957); Flowers
v. State, -Del-, 272 A.2d 704 (1970); People v.
Birdette, 22 Ill.2d 578, 177 N.E.2d 170 (1961); Annot.,
41 A.L.R. 341 (1926).
91 Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968). See Alford
v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); United States v.
Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846
(1968); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 737 (1954). Cf. United
States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 869 (1970) (depends on danger to witness's
personal safety); United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263
(2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735
(7th Cir. 1969).
92See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 371 F.2d 365,
367 (9th Cir. 1967).
respects. It has been said that the motivations of
informers "run the gamut from sheer mischief to
calculated self-aggrandizement." 93 The defense
lawyer should take great pains to point out to the
jury that the testimony of addict informers, be-
cause of the informers' varying motives, should be
scrutinized intensely.
The right of the defense to cross-examine an
addict regarding his use of narcotics is well-estab-
lished. 4 It is helpful to develop on cross-examina-
tion such facts as the length of time the witness
has been addicted, the type of drug he uses, the
"size of his habit," where he obtained the drugs,
and how he obtained the money to pay for them.
It is most important to find out the last time he
took drugs before getting on the stand9 and
whether drugs were furnished by the police. De-
fense counsel should attempt to establish that the
witness would do or say almost anything to ob-
tain drugs. It is also important to determine
whether the police or the addict informer made the
initial contact and what the informer intended to
receive from the police as a quid pro quo. There
might have been payment in money or narcotics,
elimination of competition, or simply police as-
surances of non-interference.
CBmDREN
The correct test of a child's competency to testify
is whether the child has the capacity to observe,
recollect, and communicate and to appreciate the
obligation to speak truthfully.96 If there is any
9
3 Rodgers v. United States, 267 F.2d 79, 88 (9th
Cir. 1959).
94 3 Wimo § 934. See Gurleski v. United States,
405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977, 981,
rek. denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); United States v.
Masino, 275 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1960); State v. Reyes,
99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400 (1965); People v. Perez, 239
Cal. App.2d 1, 48 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1965); State v. Fong
Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 P. 233 (1916); People v.
Crump, 5 Ill.2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615 (1955); People v.
Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 159 N.E.2d
549, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 920 (1959); Lankford v.
Tombari, 35 Wash.2d 412, 213 P.2d 627 (1950); Annot.,
52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957). Cf. Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 745,
764 (1966) (cross-examination as to habitual drunken-
ness).9 5 See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 269 F.2d 688
(1st Cir. 1959). One court has ruled that the cross-
examiner may compel an addict informer to exhibit
his arm to the jury to show them the informer's use of
narcotics. People v. Boyd, 17 Ill.2d 321,326, 161 N.E.2d
311, 314 (1959).
96 2 WiGmom §§ 505-07. See Wheeler v. United
States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895); People v. Davis, 10 Ill.2d
430, 140 N.E.2d 675, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 820 (1957);
People v. Crowe, 390 Ill. 294, 61 N.E.2d 348 (1945);
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question regarding the child's competency, an
objection should be made so that a voir dire exami-
nation can be conducted outside the presence of
the jury." On voir dire, examine the child thor-
oughly as to his qualifications. Pay particular at-
tention to whether or not the child understands
the meaning of an oath. Ascertain whether or not
anybody has explained the meaning of it to him.
Ask whether he knows what it is to lie and what
would happen to him if he lied. This is a wise move
under almost all circumstances simply to get an
insight into the type of witness the child will make
before the jury. Object, under any circumstances,
to the child being sworn.
Cross-examination of a child should be under-
taken cautiously. It is an old adage that the truth
is heard from fools and small children. Giving
either the opportunity to expand his story on cross-
examination may strengthn his direct testimony.
On occasion, however, it may become obvious
that the child is too well rehearsed and appears to
have memorized his story. In this case, it may be
wise to take the child over the same ground in
order to elicit answers in which the child uses the
identical language.98 This memorization can also
be exposed by having the child meticulously and
rapidly repeat his testimony. As he speaks rapidly,
the memorized portions of his testimony will stand
out from those that were not memorized. He may
be using words that are not natural for his age
and vocabulary. Testimony is easily implanted in
the minds of children by interested persons. Under
these circumstances, it is wise to examine care-
fully the number of times the child has gone over
the story with parents, police, prosecutors, and
friends.
The prosecutor may ask leading questions of a
child of tender years on direct examination.99
Whether to object to the leading nature of the
questions and risk antagonizing the jury is a value
judgment counsel must make. Few objections
Senecal v. Drolette, 304 N.Y. 446, 108 N.E.2d 602
(1952); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 386 (1962); Comment,
Youth as a Bar to Testimonial Competence, 8 Ann. L.
Rxv. 100 (1954). This is also the rule in Canada. See
Cartwright, The Prospective Child Witness, 6 CRim.
L.Q. 196 (1963).
" Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 WAsH. L. !xv.
303, 312-13 (1962). See People v. Moretti, 6 Ill.2d 494,
129 N.E.2d 709 (1955), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 947 (1958);
LoBiondo v. Allen, 132 N.J.L. 437, 40 A.2d 810 (1945).
9 BAER § 37, 3 Busca § 406.
99 See, e.g., People v. Schladweiler, 315 Ill. 553, 146
N.E. 525 (1925); State v. Davis, 20 Wash.2d 443, 147
P.2d 940 (1944).
should be made, but those that are can be accom-
panied by a statement for the benefit of the jury
that the prosecutor is testifying and not the child.
This will show them that the child's testimony was
the product of suggestive direct examination by
the prosecutor.100
Children are extremely imaginative. Their
stories can be pure fiction or part fact and part
fiction."0 If the child has let his imagination run
away with him, encourage him to exaggerate.
Gently lead him further and further until his story
reaches the point of absurdity. Since young chil-
dren are prone to suggestion, it is well to state
questions affirmatively. The child is likely to
answer "yes" to a question that suggests a yes
answer. If the cross-examiner can lead the child
into ridiculous admissions by a soft, friendly and
suggestive technique, it becomes apparent to the
jury that the child may have been led in direct
examination in the same manner.
CONCLUSION
The importance of cross-examination in criminal
trials can hardly be over-emphasized.1 2 Deliberate
and thoughtful cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses will have a devastating effect on the
state's case. Conversely, a perfunctory, meandering
examination by defense counsel may well vitiate
whatever merit his case holds. As one lawyer ob-
served, "More cross-examinations are suicidal
than homicidal." 10
As a rule, defense counsel's cross-examination
will not be "suicidal" if he has adequately prepared
his case. This requires the use of all modes of pre-
trial investigation and discovery. It involves a keen
perception of all testimony given by adverse wit-
nesses before and during trial. With this sort of
preparation, the skilled lawyer will design the style
and strategy that will maximize the impact of his
cross-examination. The suggestions and ideas
proffered in this article hopefully will aid in the
achievement of that end.
100 See Stafford, supra note 97, at 308; Note, The
Problem of the Child Witness, 10 Wyo. LJ. 214, 220
(1956).
10 BAER § 37; GoLnsTrm § 576; Stafford, supra note
97, at 309-10. See 3 BuscH § 374; CoRmELrus, supra
note 39, at 130-37. See, e.g., People v. Oyola, 6 N.Y.2d
259, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203, 160 N.E.2d 494 (1959).
102 "[Cross-examination] is beyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth." 5 WioGoRE § 1367.
1
03 Emory R. Buckner as quoted in F. WELam , THE
ART oF CRoss ExAM ATION 204 (1936).
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